PROJECT RUBY: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES

A plain-language scorecard on every major player in the Project Ruby deal — and what they stand to gain or lose.

A Plain-Language Guide for Columbus Residents

Based on publicly available information and the proposed Development Agreement

First, What Exactly Is Project Ruby?

Project Ruby is a proposal to build a massive computing facility — called a hyperscale data center — on 865 acres off Layfield Road near Upatoi, in northeastern Muscogee County. The developer says the total investment will be around $5.18 billion, built out between 2027 and 2030.

Data centers are the giant buildings that power the internet, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence. They are filled with thousands of computers that run 24 hours a day and require enormous amounts of electricity and water to keep cool.

The company actually operating the facility has not been publicly named. The project is being developed through a Georgia-based firm called Habitat Real Estate Partners, which set up a company called Muscogee Property 1 LLC specifically for this deal. Atlas Development is also involved.

Columbus city officials have promoted this as a major economic win. This document takes a closer look at who actually benefits — and who bears the costs.

This document focuses on the financial impact on residents and the city budget. Environmental and water concerns are real and are being addressed in separate reporting. What has gotten far less attention is the money — and that’s what this guide covers.

The Scorecard: Who Wins and Who Loses?

The table below lays out every major player in this deal and what they stand to gain or lose.

Who Our Verdict What It Means for Them
Developers (Habitat & Atlas) ▲ Clear Winner They make their money upfront and walk away.
  • They buy rural land cheaply, rezone it for industrial use, and collect large development fees.
  • Once the project is handed off, their financial risk is essentially zero.
  • They have no long-term stake in whether the project delivers what Columbus was promised.
  • They stand to make large amounts of money on this property for years to come.
Data Center Operator (unnamed) ▲ Clear Winner They get a great deal on power and taxes.
  • They secure access to a massive, uninterrupted power supply — exactly what AI computing requires.
  • They avoid paying sales tax on hundreds of millions of dollars of computer equipment, thanks to Georgia’s data center tax exemption.
  • The actual company’s name won’t be public until a permit is filed.
  • The profits on the investment are massive relative to the risks and costs.
Georgia Power ▲ Winner They profit from building the new grid infrastructure this requires.
  • Georgia law guarantees Georgia Power approximately 10.5% profit on all new infrastructure it builds.
  • Every new power line and substation for this project expands their guaranteed profit base.
  • That infrastructure cost ultimately flows through to ratepayers’ bills.
Columbus City Budget ▶ Mixed The city gets real money, but it’s more fragile than it looks.
  • The city will receive an estimated $13–$15.8 million per year in franchise fees on the data center’s electricity use. This is reliable because it’s tied to power use, not computer chip prices.
  • The city projects $68.7 million per year in property taxes by 2030 — but this figure is based on current high chip prices and could drop dramatically if the global tech market cools.
  • There is no guaranteed minimum payment (called a PILOT) in the agreement, meaning the city has no contractual floor if revenues disappoint.
  • The city has also acknowledged it cannot require the developer to meet any commitments, because no formal incentive agreement was signed.
Columbus Water Works — Neutral They got their costs covered upfront, but took on new long-term obligations.
  • The developer paid $30 million upfront to cover the cost of extending water lines to the remote site — so Water Works isn’t out of pocket initially.
  • However, they now have a large, demanding new industrial customer in a hard-to-reach location.
  • If the facility’s water needs grow beyond what the pipes can handle, the upgrade cost falls on Water Works — and ultimately ratepayers.
Columbus Residents & Ratepayers ▼ Clear Loser Residents absorb real costs while benefits flow mostly to the city’s general fund.
  • Since 2022, the average Georgia Power customer has absorbed about $43 more per month in electricity costs to fund the grid upgrades that the data center boom requires.
  • The Georgia PSC’s own consumer protection staff found that large industrial customers like data centers push fuel costs up 5–11% per month for everyone else on the grid.
  • Even if Columbus passed 100% of the franchise fee back to households as a bill credit — which isn’t how it works — that would only cover about $13 to $16 per month. That’s roughly one-third of the $43/month rate increase already absorbed.
  • Approximately 195 permanent jobs are promised, with salaries of $80K–$120K. These are real benefits, but they reach a very small share of the 81,400 households in Columbus.
The Environment ▼ Loser 865 acres of forest cleared, with ongoing chemical and carbon risks.
  • The entire 865-acre site will be cleared and graded, removing forest canopy and threatening Kendall Creek with runoff.
  • The facility will draw significant amounts of water from the Chattahoochee River for cooling. The cooling process concentrates river contaminants and discharges them back into the city sewer.
  • Studies of similar data center cooling systems have found corrosion inhibitors, biocides, and PFAS (“forever chemicals”) in the discharge. It is not yet clear who would pay for advanced treatment — it should be the operator, not Columbus ratepayers.
  • The facility runs on continuous baseload power from a grid that is approximately 78% natural gas.

The Core Financial Problem: A Fragile Promise

What the city was promised

Columbus has been told this project will generate $68.7 million a year in property taxes by 2030. That’s a compelling number. But it’s important to understand where it comes from — because it comes with a serious catch.

Why the number is fragile

A data center’s taxable value is largely based on the computer hardware inside it — thousands of specialized chips and servers that get replaced every three to five years. The price of that hardware fluctuates dramatically based on global supply and demand.

A Simple Example

When chips are scarce and expensive, a hardware upgrade might cost $100 million. At a 9% local tax rate, Columbus collects $9 million. When chip manufacturers catch up with demand and prices fall, the same upgrade might cost $50 million. Columbus now collects $4.5 million — half as much — while every city expense stays exactly the same.

The $68.7 million projection is based on today’s artificially high AI-era chip prices. If those prices normalize — as they have repeatedly throughout history — the revenue could shrink by half or more, with no warning and no protection for the city.

The missing safety net

Most cities that attract data centers negotiate what’s called a PILOT agreement — a Payment in Lieu of Taxes. This is a simple contractual guarantee: no matter what happens to chip prices, the company must pay the city a fixed minimum amount every single year.

Columbus does not have one. There is no floor. If revenues collapse, there is nothing in the contract to catch the fall.

Choose Columbus’s own public FAQ states: “Because we are not providing any incentives, we cannot require that a company perform to any commitments.”

That means no job targets, no minimum tax payments, and no way to hold the developer accountable if the project underdelivers.

What Does This Mean for Your Monthly Bill?

Let’s put some real numbers on this.

Item Monthly Impact on Your Bill
Rate increases already absorbed since 2022 (grid upgrades driven partly by data center boom) +$43.00 / month
Georgia Power’s promised rate relief (projected by 2029 — not guaranteed) −$8.50 / month
Project Ruby franchise fee — hypothetical best case if 100% returned to households (not how it works in practice) −$13 to −$16 / month
Bottom line: Even in the absolute best case, the franchise fee only covers about one-third of what residents have already absorbed.   Net: still +$19 to +$22 / month

The franchise fee goes into the city’s general fund — not directly to your utility bill. So this table shows a hypothetical best case that doesn’t actually exist. In reality, the fee helps pay for city services, which is genuinely useful. But it doesn’t reduce your power bill.

The Flint Energies Problem

Project Ruby has asked for a 600-megawatt power connection from Flint Energies — a rural electric cooperative that serves this part of Georgia. At full buildout, that could grow to 900 megawatts. To put that in perspective, 600 megawatts is enough electricity to power hundreds of thousands of average homes.

Here’s the problem: Flint Energies is a rural co-op. It doesn’t have 600 megawatts of available capacity. Georgia Power would almost certainly need to become involved to deliver the required power — which means this is a statewide grid question, not just a local one.

Flint Energies is a cooperative, which means its costs are shared among its member-ratepayers: farmers, small businesses, and rural households. If expanding the grid to serve this facility costs money — and it will — those costs don’t disappear. They get spread across Flint’s members.

The Georgia PSC’s own Public Interest Advocacy staff — the people whose job is to protect ordinary ratepayers — formally found that large industrial customers like data centers drive average fuel costs up 5 to 11 percent per month for everyone else on the grid. The PSC approved the agreement anyway.

The Bottom Line

Project Ruby will make money for the developers, the unnamed tech company, and Georgia Power. The city of Columbus will receive real franchise fee revenue that can fund public services. Those are facts.

But the financial structure of this deal — as it currently stands — leaves ordinary Columbus residents exposed:

  • The biggest projected tax revenue number ($68.7M/year) is built on today’s unusually high chip prices and could shrink dramatically.
  • There is no minimum payment guarantee to protect the city if those revenues fall.
  • The city cannot require the developer to meet any commitments, because no formal incentive agreement was signed.
  • Residents are already absorbing $43/month in rate increases driven partly by the data center boom, and the PSC’s own staff says those costs go up further with each large industrial customer added to the grid.
  • The franchise fee — while genuine and stable — goes to the city’s general budget, not to residents’ utility bills, and even if it did, it would only cover about a third of what’s already been lost.

A project of this size, drawing this much power, built on this amount of land, should come with iron-clad protections for the public. Right now, those protections are not in the agreement.

What to Ask Your Council Member Before They Vote

  • Is there a minimum annual payment (PILOT) guarantee in the contract? If not, why not?
  • Who pays for the grid upgrades needed to deliver 600+ MW to the Upatoi site?
  • Who pays for advanced water treatment if the cooling discharge contains harmful chemicals?
  • Are the $68.7M tax projections based on today’s chip prices or long-term averages?
  • What happens if the project is never completed — or is sold to a different operator?

Want to weigh in? Contact your Columbus City Council representative, or request a copy of the proposed development agreement from the Columbus City Clerk’s office. Public hearings on Project Ruby are your opportunity to ask these questions directly.

Sources: Choose Columbus Project Ruby FAQ; Georgia Public Service Commission filings; U.S. Census Bureau; Georgia Power IRP; peer-reviewed data center cooling system studies; Columbus Water Works. This document is for civic information purposes.